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that a system requiring taxation at the place where the property has been
located for the greater part of the year is the best system available under
an assessment arrangement.
OMISSION OF MISTAKEN INSERTIONS IN WILL CONTESTS
Although the English probate courts frequently have exercised the
power to omit words mistakenly inserted in a will, American courts have
neither exercised nor denied this power. However, if the mistaken
insertion results in a misdescription of the person or object intended,
and if the description in the will is ambiguous when disposition of the
property is attempted, the power of construction will be used by both
the English and American courts to clarify the ambiguity, thereby cor-
recting the mistake. Unfortunately the construction power cannot be
used to correct all such misdescriptions. Several states have adopted a
strict rule excluding extrinsic evidence which purports to prove the
ambiguity of a description which applies perfectly to an existing person
or object due to facts and circumstances relating to the testator: thus,
even when a testator describes property that he does not own, this rule
has been applied to prevent the admission of extrinsic evidence to show
that the description is ambiguous because the testator owns property
similarly described.' Furthermore, mistaken insertions which result in
misdescriptions that are not ambiguous when disposition is attempted,
or which result in non-misdescriptions2 cannot be corrected by construc-
tion because the only evidence available to correct the mistake would be
evidence that a word was inserted by mistake; and, such evidence is not
admissible in a construction proceeding. The English probate courts
would correct such mistaken insertions by omission. Assuming that a
remedy should exist to correct all mistaken insertions and thereby
1. Estate of Lynch, 142 Cal. 373, 75 Pac. 1086 (1904) ; Perkins v. O'Donald, 77
Fla. 710, 82 So. 401 (1919) ; Stevenson v. Stevenson, 285 I1. 486, 121 N.E. 202 (1918) :
McGovern v. McGovern, 75 Minn. 314, 77 N.W. 970 (1899) ; Barner v. Lehr, 190 Miss.
77, 199 So. 273 (1940). But see Wheaton v. Pope, 91 Minn. 299, 97 N.W. 1046 (1904).
2. The term "non-misdescription" refers to situations in which the mistake does
not involve a description and to situations in which the property described is intended
but there is a mistake as to the amount intended. See note 39 infra. Although non-
misdescriptions could include all patent and latent mistaken insertions which do not re-
sult in misdescriptions, the term has significance only with respect to latent mistaken
insertions and is, therefore, used only in reference to latent mistaken insertions. How-
ever, even if the term were used to include patent mistaken insertions, correction by
construction would be impossible except in a few rare cases. See note 47 infra and
accompanying text.
NOTES
effectuate testators' intent, justification is needed for the failure of
American lawyers to request American probate courts to follow the
English common law precedent of omission. Before seeking justification,
it must be determined whether or not omission is consistent with sound
probate theory.
THE LEGAL THEORY: PROBATE OMISSION AND THE
STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Anglo-American law grants to testators the right to determine the
posthumous disposition of their property To effectuate this right a
testator must express his testamentary intent in a writing which has been
signed by the testator and which has been attested and subscribed by
the requisite number of witnesses.' If the writing expresses the subjective
disposition which the testator wished to be made of his property, the
testamentary intent has been expressed.
A writing which complies with the foregoing formalities is generally
the best possible objective evidence of testamentary intent. It would
seem to follow that the purpose of the writing requirement is to force
decedents to provide such evidence in order that distribution of their
property can be made with the greatest possible certainty of effectuating
their testamentary intent.' To achieve this purpose probate statutes
arbitrarily provide that only such a writing may be probated as a will and
also provide an intestate plan of distribution for decedents who fail to
execute such a writing.
However, the writing allegedly provided by a testator is not always
reliable or sufficient evidence of testamentary intent. In order for a court
to be reasonably certain that the writing offered for probate is both
reliable and sufficient evidence of testamentary intent, two determina-
tions may be necessary. First, the court must determine whether or not
the writing was duly executed whenever an issue of due execution is
raised. This determination is made by inquiring whether or not all the
words in the writing were, under a free and normal exercise of the testa-
tor's mental processes, intended to be physically included as a part of
the writing. For, if fraud, duress, or any other valid objection to the
due execution occurred, all, or a part, of the writing does not constitute
the testator's testamentary intent. The objectionable part should there-
fore be denied probate. Second, the court must determine the meaning
3. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-502-03 (Burns 1953). See also 1 PAGE, WILLS
§§ 46, 238, 273, 306 (3d ed. 1941). An exception to these requirements is sometimes made
for nuncupative wills.
4. In addition to greater certainty, the writing requirement provides greater speed
at less expense in distributing testator's property.
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which the testator was attempting to convey by the words expressed in
the writing. Since the meaning of language is frequently dependent upon
the circumstances in which it was uttered, failure to seek the meaning of
the writing in accordance with such circumstances may result in a failure
to effectuate the testator's testamentary intent.
Both of the foregoing determinations require the admission of
extrinsic evidence. However, if such evidence is admitted, the writing
requirement will have the limited effect of excluding only extrinsic
evidence of testamentary intent which is offered for probate as a part of
the testator's will.' Admittedly, the language of the statutes is consistent
with this limitation. Furthermore, if the writing requirement was to have
the broader effect of excluding all extrinsic evidence, the purpose for the
writing requirement, viz., certainty as to the testamentary intent, would
be frustrated. Therefore, the admission of extrinsic evidence for making
both determinations appears to be consistent with the language and
purpose of the writing requirement. In addition, the fact that courts
have made both determinations for several hundred years and the fact
that probate statutes frequently provide for making both determinations
seem to confirm that the effect of the writing requirement was intended
to be so limited.
The procedure for making the two determinations is not the same.
Generally, probate statutes provide that the due execution of a will may
be challenged in a will contest. On the other hand the meaning of the
will is determined in a construction proceeding in accordance with rules
of construction which are used by the court to enable it to ascertain the
testamentary intent.6 Although power to construe the will may be derived
from an express statutory provision,' courts have, apparently, always
5. Even this limited effect might be considered to be too broad. Although it is
undoubtedly necessary to exclude extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent which a tes-
tator has allegedly omitted from the writing, it is open to serious question whether
or not extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent which has been omitted due to fraud
or mistake should or need be excluded. In the latter case it cannot be argued that the
admission of such evidence will result in a failure by testators to express their testa-
mentary intent in writing. Also, extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent which was
fraudulently or mistakenly omitted is the best evidence of the testamentary intent. Fi-
nally, it seems that a fraudulent or mistaken omission can be as reliably proved as a
fraudulent or mistaken insertion. The admission of such evidence is admittedly a policy
question, but the reasons for its admission seem to outweigh any reasons for its exclusion.
6. The separation of will contests (probate issues) and construction proceedings
(construction issues) is derived from the English common law procedure. In England,
probate issues are tried by the Probate Division of the High Court of Justice (super-
seding the ecclesiastical court) while construction issues are tried by the Chancery Di-
vision of the High Court of Justice (superseding the Chancellor). Although a dis-
tinction is still made between probate and construction issues, a single court decides
both issues in most states. See text accompanying notes 36-40 infra.
7. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-605 (Burns 1953).
NOTES
made this determination as a matter of necessity without express auth-
ority.
From the foregoing discussion it appears that extrinsic evidence is
admissible in a will contest to provide any valid objection to the due
execution of a will. Since a mistaken insertion is not intended by the
testator to be executed as a part of his will, the existence of a mistaken
insertion is a valid objection to the due execution of a portion of the
will.8 Therefore, extrinsic evidence, if reliable, should be admissible to
prove the existence of a mistaken insertion. Once the mistaken insertion
is proved, it should be omitted from the will.
It remains to determine whether or not extrinsic evidence of a mis-
taken insertion can be reliably admitted as a valid objection to the due
execution of the writing. The law is settled that certain types of extrinsic
evidence' may be admissible to show the undue execution of a will because
of fraud, duress, or undue influence." Such evidence should have even
greater reliability in many mistaken insertion cases because the existence
of the mistake is indicated by evidence as reliable as a will or by the will
itself." Therefore, it would seem that such extrinsic evidence can be
reliably admitted to prove that a word was mistakenly inserted in a will.
It is essential that mistaken insertions be distinguished from other
mistakes of fact.12  Mistakes of fact can be conveniently classified into
three categories. First, there are mistakes in the expression of intent.
This category includes situations where the testator is mistaken as to some
fact concerning a person or object which the testator has attempted to
8. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-117 (Burns 1953) providing that the grounds for
contesting a will include ". . . the undue execution of the will, that the same was
executed under duress, or was obtained by fraud, or any other valid objection to its
validity. . . ." This provision would appear to include any objection to the execution
of the will which would be valid at common law. Since the existence of a mistaken
insertion is a valid objection to the execution of the mistaken portion of the will under
the English common law, the statute appears to expressly provide for the correction of
mistaken insertions.
9. For example, evidence of the testator's surrounding circumstances is admissible
while testimony by a witness that the testator had said that he intended to make a be-
quest to the witness is generally inadmissible.
10. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-117 (Burns 1953). Although probate statutes
generally provide for will contests, in most jurisdictions the grounds for contesting a
will are determined by case law rather than by statute. For an exhaustive list, see 1
PAGE, WILLS §§ 177, 181, 192, 193, 195 (3d ed. 1941).
11. See, e.g., Fulton v. Andrew, L.R. 7 H.L. 448 (1875); Goods of Walkley, 1 R.
480 (1893). See p. 573 and note 83 in fra for a discussion of these cases. Furthermore,
a mistaken insertion can be proved with greater certainty than fraud in the inducement,
duress, or undue influence because it is not necessary to weigh the impact of the cir-
cumstances on the testator's mental processes.
12. Mistakes of law raise different questions than mistakes of fact and are not
discussed herein. Generally, mistakes of law cannot be corrected. In re Gluckman's
Will, 87 N.J. Eq. 638, 101 Atl. 295 (1917), reversing 87 N.J. Eq. 280, 98 Atl. 831
(1916). See also 1 PAGE, WILLS § 165 (3d ed. 1941).
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describe and also situations where the testator has ascribed to his words
a meaning which differs from the meaning given to those words by the
average person.13 For example, a testator devises a "red house" which,
unbeknown to the testator, has been painted green. Since the words used
by the testator are intended to be physically included, the mistake is not
a valid objection to the due execution of the will. But, the words are
inadequate to convey the testator's meaning with sufficient clarity.
Mistakes in the expression of intent involve the meaning of the words
used and thus raise construction rather than probate issues.
Second, there are mistakes in the inducement of intent. In such a
situation the testamentary intent is induced by some extrinsic fact of
which the testator is mistaken. For example, a testator stipulates in his
will that "all my property, which I wanted my son to possess, should be
given to XYZ charity as my son is dead." After the testator's death, the
son returns from a foreign country, where he previously had been
reported as dead. If it appears in the will that a mistake was made, that
the mistake induced the disposition, and what disposition would have been
made but for the mistake, there is some authority that the disposition
included in the will should be ignored and the testator's testamentary
intent, but for the mistake, 4 given effect. As the words used by the
testator are intended to be physically included in the will, inducement
mistakes are not valid objections to the due execution of the will; rather,
such mistakes involve the expression of an alternative" testamentary
13. See Moseley v. Goodman, 138 Tenn. 1, 195 S.W. 590 (1917) where extrinsic
evidence was admitted to show that a devise to "Mrs. Moseley" was intended for a
woman named Mrs. Trimble, whom the testator generally called "Mrs. Moseley," even
though there was a claimant named "Mrs. Moseley." An argument can be made that
such a situation does not represent a mistake in the expression of intent. The inclusion
of such situations is based upon the testator's mistaken expression of his intent in terms
of the normal meaning of the words which he used.
14. Gillespie v. Gillespie, 96 N.J. Eq. 501, 126 Atl. 744 (1924), aff'd, 98 N.J. Eq.
413, 414, 129 Ati. 922 (1925) (revocation of legacy based on mistake) ; In re Wright
Estate, [1937] 3 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 452; Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. Jun. 321, 30
Eng. Rep. 1033 (P. 1797) (revocation of legacy based on mistake); Gifford v. Dyer,
2 R.I. 99, 102, 57 Am. Dec. 708, 709 (1852) (dictum). In most states a similar result
is achieved, in part, by the statutory protection of the pretermitted child. See 1 PAGE.
WILLS § 525 (3d ed. 1941). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 113-210 (1937). The testamentary
intent of the testator would normally be effectuated by giving effect to the intent but for
the mistake. However, when the mistake involves more than one person, the intent but
for the mistake may not be sufficiently certain in regard to the proper disposition among
the several persons. In the latter situation intestacy may, more or less, achieve the
testator's intent when only members of the family are involved. In re Wright Estate,
supra. If intestacy is insufficient, possibly a constructive trust could be imposed by a
court exercising equitable jurisdiction to prevent unjust enrichment of the legatee mis-
takenly named in the will.
15. Alternative intent should be distinguished from conditional intent which all
courts will effectuate. The latter is exemplified by the following: "I leave all my
property to my son. But, in the event of his death, I leave the property to XYZ charity."
NOTES
intent. The disposition to XYZ charity in the foregoing example was an
alternate, or substitute, for the disposition to the son which the testator
would have made if the facts were not as he mistakenly believed them
to be."0
Third, there are mistakes in the execution of the intent' For ex-
ample, a testator attempts to give all his property to his Son, but the
word "real" is mistakenly inserted before the word "property" in the
testator's will. Such a situation will be referred to as a mistaken inser-
tion. In addition to mistaken insertions, this category includes situations
where an entire writing is executed which is not intended to constitute the
testator's will. In the latter situation, the entire writing is omitted from
probate.' However, in mistaken insertion cases, only a portion of the
words in the writing have been inserted by mistake. Such words should
be omitted. As mistaken insertions are the only mistakes other than
mistakes as to the entire writing which constitute a valid objection to the
due execution of a will, only mistaken insertions can be corrected by
omission.
Although omission of a mistakenly inserted word should be re-
quested by commencing a will contest," the same result may be achieved
in a construction proceeding by giving a word no meaning whenever the
writing and the surrounding circumstances of the testator convince the
court that a word was either not necessary to or not properly included
in the testamentary intent which the testator had attempted to express. 9
However, correction by construction is basically" limited to misdescrip-
tion cases in which the court concludes that a description in the will is
ambiguous when disposition is attempted, and that the remainder of the
16. If the words "which I wanted my son to possess" were omitted, the intent but
for the mistake would not be so clear. The possibility that less than all the property
would have been given to the son might result in some courts refusing to allow the son
to take any of the property. Contra, In re Wright Estate, [1937] 3 West. Weekly R.
(n.s.) 452.
17. Bradford v. Blossom, 207 Mo. 177, 105 S.W. 289 (1907) ; Goods of Hunt, L.R.
3 P. & D. 250 (1875) ; 1 PAGE, WILLS §§ 162, 163 (3d ed. 1941).
18. See notes 6, 8 szupra and accompanying text.
19. See Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886) ; Pate v. Bushong, 161 Ind. 533, 69
N.E. 291 (1903). See also Hertford v. Harned, 185 Ind. 213, 113 N.E. 727 (1916)
where an entire clause was given no meaning. It was not clear in either the Patch or
the Pate case whether the mistake was a mistaken insertion or a mistake in expression.
Both cases involved misdescriptions. In such cases it is frequently stated that the court
must reject the false part of the description and give effect to the remainder. Pate v.
Bushong, supra at 553, 69 N.E. at 298. Rejection of the false part of a description is
often referred to as an application of the maxim, falsa denonstratio nom nocet. See note
34 infra. A court must determine which part of the description, if any, is false or
should be given no meaning. This determination is not difficult when the description
is of property because of the presumption that a testator intends to dispose of only his
own property. See text accompanying notes 29-32 infra.
20. For a rare exception, see note 47 in-fra and accompanying text.
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description is sufficient to identify the person or object intended by the
testator. 1 The following exemplifies such a situation: a testator owned
a green house on Third Street; the testator had never owned any other
house; in his will the testator described the house as "my red house on
Third Street." Unless the court determines that the testator meant
"green" when he used the word "red," the court, in effect, would have
to give the word "red" no meaning in order to find the description
adequate to devise the house.
The mistake in the foregoing example could be the result of either
a mistake in expression, susceptible to construction, or a mistaken in-
sertion, susceptible to omission; the former would be exemplified by a
mistake as to the color of the house while the latter would consist of a
mistaken insertion of the word "red." If there is available evidence
indicating that the latter occurred, the word should be omitted rather
than given no meaning. However, if the evidence indicates the former
occurred, or if there is no evidence to indicate which occurred, correction
by construction seems quite proper and probably more desirable than
correction by omission.
The foregoing examination of probate theory demonstrates that the
omission of words mistakenly inserted in a will appears to be not only
permissible by the language of probate statutes but also completely con-
sistent with the underlying theory of such statutes. As American lawyers
have not requested the omission of mistaken insertions, there is a need
to determine when omission should be requested and why such requests
have not been made.22
CORRECTION BY CONSTRUCTION
Some mistaken insertions can be corrected in a construction proceed-
ing. A construction proceeding involves an issue as to the meaning of the
21. Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 116, 40 N.E. 553 (1895).
22. Although omission has been requested in will contests, none of the cases in-
volved mistaken insertions. Burger v. Hill, 1 Bradf. 360 (N.Y. 1850), equitable relief
denied, Hill v. Burger, 10 How. Pr. 264 (N.Y. 1854) ; Alexander's Estate, 206 Pa. 47,
55 At. 797 (1903). In Burger v. Hill, supra, the testator mistakenly thought that the
term "real estate" included a leasehold. Since the case did not involve a mistaken in-
sertion, the omission made by the court was erroneous. The same result possibly
could have been achieved in a construction proceeding by giving the words "real estate"
the special meaning of the testator. See Mosely v. Goodman, 138 Tenn. 1, 195 S.W.
590 (1917) and cases discussed therein. Since there was no property to which the
testator's language could apply in the absence of a special meaning, such evidence might
have been admitted even though it is often stated that evidence of a special meaning is
inadmissible where the words have a common, unambiguous meaning. See, e.g., Jones
v. Bennett, 78 N.H. 224, 99 Atl. 18 (1916) (affirmed on rehearing). See also note 35
infra and accompanying text. On the other hand, relief might even be denied in a con-
struction proceeding on the basis that mistakes as to the legal effect of words expressed
in a will cannot be corrected, In re Gluckman's Will, 87 N.J. Eq. 638, 101 AtI. 295
(1917), reversing 87 N.J. Eq. 280, 98 Atl. 831 (1916). See also 1 PAGE, WILLS § 165 (3d
ed. 1941).
NOTES
words used in the will. When the words used are ambiguous and can be
clarified by evidence relating to the testator's meaning, the ambiguity will
be clarified. The availability of construction, therefore, depends upon
whether or not the words mistakenly inserted create an ambiguity
susceptible of clarification by such evidence. Generally, the creation
of such an ambiguity will depend upon whether the mistaken insertion
is latent (not apparent upon the face of the will) or patent (apparent
upon the face of the will).
A. Latent Mistaken Insertions: Herein Latent Ambiguities
A latent mistaken insertion may result in a misdescription of the per-
son or object intended by the testator. In such a case extrinsic evidence,
introduced to identify the beneficiaries or the property disposed of by the
will, may indicate that the description is ambiguous. Such ambiguities
are referred to as latent ambiguities in a construction proceeding. Mis-
descriptions represent one type of latent ambiguity which may be clarified
by construction. The following exemplifies a misdescription which could
result from a latent mistaken insertion and which could be clarified as a
latent ambiguity: the testator devises his house to "John Smith";
extrinsic evidence indicates that the testator knew no "John Smith" but
had a friend named Bill Smith. Generally, such a description would be
found ambiguous and further extrinsic evidence would be admitted to
determine which Smith was intended by the testator." The word "John"
would be effectively given no meaning and the word "Smith" would be
found adequate to identify the person known and therefore intended
by the testator. However, the mistake in such a case could also be the
result of a mistake in expression. 4. Since the issue is only the meaning
of the words used, it is unnecessary for a court to determine whether the
misdescription resulted from a mistaken insertion or a mistake in ex-
pression. When the misdescription is a latent ambiguity and results
from a mistaken insertion, correction by construction provides a method
of correction alternative to omission.
In several states, however, the strict application of the single plain
meaning rule would prevent the clarification of some misdescriptions by
denying the existence of a latent ambiguity. If a description in the will
23. See Thayer v. Boston, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 347 (1860); Powell v. Biddle, 2
Dall. (Pa.) 70 (1790) ; Ex parte King, 132 S.C. 63, 128 S.E. 850 (1925) ; Siegley v.
Simpson, 73 Wash. 69, 131 Pac. 479 (1913). But see Polsey v. Newton, 199 Mass. 450
85 N.E. 574 (1908) ; Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc., 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 188 (1843). The
absence in the description of the words "my friend" should not affect the decision.
See note 32 infra.
24. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
25. Estate of Lynch, 142 Cal. 373, 75 Pac. 1086 (1905) ; Perkins v. O'Donald, 77
Fla. 710, 82 So. 401 (1919) ; Stevenson v. Stevenson, 285 Ill. 486, 121 N.E. 202 (1918) ;
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perfectly describes an existing person or object and misdescribes another
person or object, such states refuse to admit extrinsic evidence to prove
that the description is actually ambiguous due to facts relating to the
testator, 26 and to prove that the testator intended the person or object
misdescribed. Such evidence, it is said, would disturb the single plain
meaning of the words used in the will. Thus, in the foregoing example,
if there were only one John Smith such courts apparently would find no
ambiguity and thus find nothing to clarify.27  This result appears to be
directly contra to the testator's testamentary intent. If there were evi-
dence that the word "John" had been inserted by mistake, it could be
omitted, and construction would then be available to clarify the ambiguity
as to which "Smith" was intended. However, an exception would be
made and omission would be unnecessary if the words "my friend"
preceded the words "John Smith" ;28 in such a case there would be an
ambiguity capable of clarification because "John" clearly was not a
friend of the testator.
The single plain meaning rule has been applied more frequently
in cases involving a misdescription of property as opposed to the mis-
description of a person. Thus, in one case 29 it appeared that the testator
had interchanged the township and range numbers in his description of
certain real property. Even though the testator did not own the land
described, but did own land which would have been described if the
McGovern v. McGovern, 75 Minn. 314, 77 N.W. 970 (1899) ; Barner v. Lehr, 190 Miss.
77, 199 So. 273 (1940). But see Wheaton v. Pope, 91 Minn. 299, 97 N.W. 1046 (1904).
Compare Tucker v. Seaman's Aid Soc., 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 188 (1843) where the single
plain meaning rule was applied to a bequest made to a beneficiary unknown to the tes-
tator even though the testator knew a beneficiary which could be similarly described,
with Bullard v. Leach, 213 Mass. 117, 100 N.E. 57 (1912) where the rule was not ap-
plied to a bequest of funds in a bank perfectly described because the testator had no
funds in the bank described but did have funds in a bank similarly described. A pos-
sible explanation of the inconsistency between the Tucker and Bidlard cases is that the
court believed extrinsic evidence was unreliable in the former because the testator's lack
of knowledge of the beneficiary described was not (or could never be) adequately proved
while the non-existence of funds in the bank and the absence of any contact with the
bank was and could be adequately proved in the latter case. However, it seems that, as
a general rule, lack of knowledge by a testator as to the existence of a person described
in his will is susceptible of being proved with adequate certainty.
26. Forexample, the testator may neither know the person nor own the property
which is perfectly described.
27. This raises a problem as to the area to be included in determining the number
of persons answering the description. If there is more than one person perfectly
described, there is an equivocation and extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine which
person was intended by the testator. Furthermore, extrinsic evidence is admissible to
clarify an equivocation by proving that the testator intended a third person who is im-
perfectly described by the will. In re Jackson, [1933] Ch. 237. See note 35 infra and
accompanying text.
28. See Stevenson v. Stevenson, 285 Il1. 486, 495, 121 N.E. 202, 205 (1918).
29. Stevenson v. Stevenson, supra note 28. But cf. Stevens v. Felman, 338 Ill. 391,
170 N.E-243 (1930).
NOTES
numbers had not been interchanged in the will, the court held that there
was no ambiguity because the description perfectly described an existing
tract of land. As a result, the testamentary intent of the testator was
seemingly frustrated. The normal presumption that a testator intends
to dispose of only his own property was held not applicable because the
will expressly disposed of property not belonging to the testator. But, the
use of words such as "my real estate," or their equivalent,"0 would give
rise to an ambiguity, allowing the normal presumption to apply."1 Fortu-
nately such absurd reasoning has been rejected in most jurisdictions. 2
If there were evidence that the township and range numbers had
been inserted by mistake in the foregoing case,"3 omission of those
numbers would have avoided the unfortunate result of the decision. If
the range and township numbers of the property which the testator did
not own had been omitted from the will, there would have been no con-
flict between the express provisions of the will and the normal presump-
tion that a testator intends to dispose of only his own property. The
normal presumption would apply and the description in the will would,
therefore, have been adequate to dispose of the testator's land notwith-
standing the absence of range and township numbers identifying the
property intended.
The other type of latent ambiguity is a description which extrinsic
evidence indicates to be equally and perfectly applicable to two or more
persons of objects. These ambiguities are commonly referred to as
equivocations.3" If a testator bequeaths property to his "nephew Arthur
Murphy" and evidence indicates that the testator has more than one
nephew so named, there is an equivocation. The court will admit extrinsic
evidence to determine, if possible, which nephew was meant by the
30. For example, the will might have stated that all the testator's property was
disposed of in the will.
31. Decker v. Decker, 121 Ill. 341, 12 N.E. 750 (1887) ; Stevenson v. Stevenson,
285 Ill. 486, 495, 121 N.E. 202, 205 (1918) (dictum). See also note 35 infra and ac-
companying text.
32. See, e.g., Patch v. White, 117 U.S. 210 (1886) ; Pate v. Bushong, 161 Ind. 533,
69 N.E. 291 (1903). See also 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1620 n.19 (3d ed. 1941).
33. It would seem that clarification by construction could be made with greater
certainty when the mistaken insertion consists of interchanging the township and range
numbers which were intended to be a part of the description than when the mistaken
insertion consists of words which were not intended to be physically included in the
description.
34. Latent ambiguity is sometimes defined so as to include only equivocations.
When so defined, misdescriptions are considered as proper situations for application of
the maxim, falsa devzonstratio non nocet. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE §§ 2472, 2476 (3rd ed.
1940). See note 19 szpra. This limitation has not been made by the courts which have
sometimes defined latent ambiguities to include both equivocations and misdescriptions,
thereby including the maxim within the term latent ambiguities. The definition in the
text follows the latter approach to avoid the unnecessary use of two terms.
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testator." It is difficult to perceive an equivocation resulting from a
latent mistaken insertion, because, if the description is equivocable after
the insertion, it necessarily was equivocable before the insertion. There-
fore, although equivocations are construed as latent ambiguities, they are
not mistaken insertions and may not be remedied by omission.
From the foregoing analysis it appears that construction can be used
to correct those latent mistaken insertions which result in misdescriptions
that are latent ambiguities. But, a latent mistaken insertion may result
in a misdescription which is not a latent ambiguity. 6 Suppose a testator
intends to devise his house to Bill Smith; but, by mistake, "John" is
inserted instead of "Bill." The words "my friend" are not included.
Extrinsic evidence indicates that although the testator knew John, Bill
was a good friend."7 In such a case an ambiguity would probably not
be found by any court. Instead, the single plain meaning rule would be
applied because the court would not be reasonably certain from evidence
relating to the testator's meaning that "Bill" was intended rather than
"John.""8  However, since these misdescriptions are not latent am-
biguities, the application of the single plain meaning rule to these cases
must be distinguished from its application elsewhere by a few courts
which merely refuse to recognize the existence of an ambiguity. Sim-
ilarily, construction would be unavailable when a latent mistaken insertion
results in an non-misdescription. For example, suppose a testator
intended to make a specific bequest of all his shares in XYZ Company
and his attorney mistakenly inserted a numerical limitation causing a
portion of the shares to pass either by the residuary clause or by
35. In re Jackson, [1933] Ch. 237. Dictum in this case suggests the absurd results
which can occur when the single plain meaning rule is applied rigidly and when the
testator's special meaning is not given effect. There were three Arthur Murphys' in-
volved. Two of them were nephews of the testatrix while the third was the illegitimate
son of the testatrix's sister and had married one of the testatrix's nieces. Evidence was
admitted of the testatrix's relationship with the three "nephews" and of a description
in a prior will in which the testatrix had referred to the illegitimate "nephew" as
her nephew. The court held that the illegitimate nephew was entitled to the bequest.
However, the court stated that, if there had been only one legitimate nephew, the fore-
going evidence would not have been admissible because there would have been no latent
ambiguity; therefore, the legitimate nephew would have taken the bequest contra to the
testatrix's testamentary intent.
36. Unless the cases involving mistakes as to the anioant of property intended to
pass by a provision are considered as misdescriptions, rather than non-misdescriptions,
the only misdescriptions which are not latent ambiguities would be mistakes as to the
person intended.
37. This same situation could be caused by a mistake in expression. However, in
such event, the mistake could not be corrected.
38. This would follow, a fortiori, in those states which find nothing ambiguous in
a devise to a person whose existence was unknown to the testator. However, the same
decision would probably be made in other states. Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 61 (1877).
See also 4 PAGE, WILLS § 1627 n.3 (3d ed. 1941).
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intestacy."0 In both of the foregoing situations, the only evidence which
could correct the mistake would be evidence that a word was mistakenly
inserted. Such evidence is inadmissible in a construction proceeding.
The reason for the inadmissibility of such evidence is based upon
the nature of a construction issue. A construction issue raises a question
as to the meaning of the testamentary intent, expressed by the language
of the testator in the will. When a court in a construction proceeding
corrects a mistaken insertion by clarification of a misdescription, it does
not purport to correct a mistake but only to clarify the meaning of the
words used in the will. But; the meaning of the words used is not the issue
in either of the foregoing examples; the issue is whether or not all the
words used were intended to be executed as a part of the will. As indicated
supra, such issues are determined in will contests.40
B. Patent Mistaken Insertions: Herein Patent Ambiguities
Patent mistaken insertions are considered patent ambiguities in a
construction proceeding. The term "patent ambiguity" is broader than
patent mistaken insertion as a patent ambiguity may be caused by either a
mistaken insertion or a mistake in expression. Although it is frequently
stated that a patent ambiguity cannot be clarified by extrinsic evidence,4'
39. Arguably, this example, involving a mistake as to the amount of property in-
tended, could be deemed a misdescription that is not a latent ambiguity. Its classifica-
tion in either category is rather arbitrary. But, its classification will not affect the
availability of either construction or omission. See note 81 infra for other examples of
non-misdescriptions.
40. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. A further distinction between the two
proceedings is the normal absence of statutory limitation on construction proceedings as
contrasted with the normal presence of statutory limitation on the period for will con-
tests. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 7-117 (Burns 1953) imposing a limitation of six
months. In addition to other factors, the nature of the factual issues in will contests
makes some limitation necessary. But, in construction proceedings, evidence of the
testator's surrounding circumstances is fairly reliable even many years after the testa-
tor's death. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-605 (Burns 1953) which authorizes con-
struction of the will during the period of administration by the court in which the will
is probated. However, the statute does not preclude construction of the will in a
proper case in suits other than probate proceedings (See official comment of com-
mission). Construction in non-probate proceedings would be subject to the statutory
limitation applicable to ejectment actions instituted to recover possession of realty or
conversion for the recovery of personalty. The Indiana statute is adopted from the
Model Probate Code § 60.
41. See, e.g., Evans v. Van Meter, 320 Ill. 195, 150 N.E. 693 (1926) ; Engelthaler
v. Engelthaler, 196 Ill. 230, 63 N.E. 669 (1902). See also Annot., 94 A.L.R. 26 (1935).
The distinction between patent and latent ambiguities as to clarification by the admis-
sion of extrinsic evidence is based upon the conception that a sufficient expression of
testamentary intent is made in cases of latent ambiguities but not in cases of patent
ambiguities; and, therefore, to admit extrinsic evidence in the patent ambiguity cases
would allow extrinsic evidence to establish the subjective testamentary intent without
a writing. However, except when there is a complete failure by the testator to express
his testamentary intent, such intent is ultimately no more clearly expressed when there
is a latent ambiguity than when there is a patent ambiguity. The testator's intended
disposition cannot necessarily be effectuated with greater facility in the one case than in
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such a rule is too broad because the only patent ambiguities which cannot
be so clarified are those which result from a complete failure by the
testator to express his testamentary intent.42 However, whenever testa-
mentary intent has been expressed, any patent ambiguity resulting there-
from may be clarified by the admission of extrinsic evidence of the
testator's surrounding circumstances.4" But, even in the latter situation,
extrinsic evidence of statements of testamentary intent is apparently
inadmissible.44 In addition, patent ambiguities may be clarified whenever
extrinsic evidence is unnecessary. Therefore, to the extent that either
extrinsic evidence of the testator's surrounding circumstances or the will
itself is sufficient for clarification, the patent ambiguity may be clarified.
As patent mistaken insertions generally consist of two inconsistent
provisions in the will, evidence that one, or part of one, provision was
inserted by mistake would be the only evidence available to indicate
which of the two provisions was intended by the testator to be his will.45
Such .evidence, as indicated above, is inadmissible because the meaning
of the words is the issue in a construction proceeding rather than
whether or not the words were intended to be physically included.46
However, when a patent mistaken insertion causes only an uncertainty
the other. The inconsistency of the distinction is illustrated by the following two
examples. Suppose a testator bequeaths a legacy to John Smith, of Athens. If there
are two John Smiths, parol proof is allowed to show which was intended. On the
other hand, suppose the same testator gives a specific legacy to his wife and niece, and
says, "In addition to what I have given her, I bequeath to her the rest of my property
remaining at my death." In such a case you cannot, by parol, prove which "her" was
meant, whether the wife or the niece. See Armistead v. Armistead, 32 Ga. 597, 601
(1861).
42. See, e.g., Engelthaler v. Engelthaler, 196 Ill. 230, 63 N.E. 669 (1902) (failure
of the testator to specify the remainderman in a provision intended to devise a re-
mainder cannot be corrected by the admission of extrinsic evidence to prove whom the
testator intended).
43. Payne v. Todd, 45 Ariz. 389, 43 P.2d 1004 (1935) (exclusion of evidence con-
cerning advancements made by the testator to his children during his lifetime and con-
cerning the relations of the parties held to be reversible error) ; Will of Dever, 173 Wis.
208, 180 N.W. 839 (1921) (in addition to evidence that the testator was uneducated and
that he had personally dictated the will using another person's will as a guide, evidence
admitted on the following: the extent of the testator's estate; the testator's family
relations; the testator's attitude toward his relatives and toward claimants under the
will). See also 4 PAGE, WILLS §§ 1623, 1624 (3d ed. 1941).
44. Achelis v. Musgrove, 212 Ala. 47, 101 So. 670 (1924) ; Alexander v. Bates, 127
Ala. 328, 28 So. 415 (1899); Gordon v. Burris, 141 Mo. 602, 43 S.W. 642 (1897);
Matter of Tinker, 157 Misc. 200, 283 N.Y. Supp. 151 (1935); Lewis v. Douglass, 14
R.I. 604 (1884) ; In re Halston, [1912] 1 Ch. 435.
45. Since mistakes in expression which result in patent ambiguities would seem to
be frequently susceptible of clarification by extrinsic evidence of the testator's sur-
rounding circumstances, they could often be clarified.
46. Compare the non-misdescription cases and misdescription cases which do not
involve latent ambiguities where there is no ambiguity in addition to the inadmissibility
of extrinsic evidence of a mistake.
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which can be clarified by either extrinsic evidence of surrounding
circumstances or the will itself, it can be clarified as a patent ambiguity.
Apparently only the latter has ever occurred, and it with extreme rarity."'
In 'summary, construction seems to be available only for the
correction of latent mistaken insertions which cause a misdescription
that is a latent ambiguity and for the correction of patent mistaken in-
sertions which result in uncertainties. The former situation is probably
the type of latent mistaken insertion most frequently made by testators.
But, the unavailability of construction as a remedy for most patent
mistaken insertions, for latent mistaken insertions resulting in non-
misdescriptions, and for latent mistaken insertions resulting in mis-
descriptions which cannot be clarified either because of the single plain
meaning rule or because they are not latent ambiguities makes omission
a valuable and essential method of correction.
The major remaining problem is to determine when evidence is
admissible and sufficient to prove the existence of a mistaken insertion
in those cases in which omission must or can be made. Since omission
of mistaken insertions has apparently never been requested of the
American courts, a review of the English cases is mandatory in order
to ascertain the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in a mistaken in-
sertion case.
CORRECTION BY OMISSION IN ENGLAND
It frequently has been contended that if the will has been read to
or by the testator,48 or if the sense of the remainder would be changed
by omission, 9 extrinsic evidence of a mistaken insertion is not admissible;
therefore, omission of a mistaken insertion could not be made in such
cases. But, as to the former contention, only extrinsic, evidence which
establishes either that the will has been properly read to or by the
testator, or that the contents of the will have been brought to the testator's
attention in some other way5" is conclusive that words were not inserted
47. Goods of Schott, [1901] P. 190; Goods of Duane, 2 Sw. & Tr. 590, 164 Eng.
Rep. 1127 (P. 1862).
48. Harter v. Harter, L.R. 3 P. & D. 11 (1873) ; Atter v. Atkinson, L.R. 1 P. & D.
665 (1869) ; Guardhouse v. Blackburn, L.R. 1 P. & D. 108 (1866).
49. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 7 App. Cas. 192, 198 (1882) (dictum); In re Horrocks,
Taylor v. Kershaw, [1939] P. 198, 218 (C.A.) (dictum) ; Gray, Striking Words Out
of A Will, 26 HARv. L. REv. 212 (1913).
50. For example, a will executed in accordance with the testator's instructions is
sufficient to show that the testator was acquainted with and approved the contents of
the will. In re Will of Sharpley, 32 Del. 154, 120 Atl. 586 (1923) ; In re Estate of
Bose, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N.W. 319 (1939).
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by mistake." The difficulty lies in determining when the contents of a
will have been properly read or have been brought to the testator's atten-
tion. A mere reading of the will to or by the testator is insufficient.52
Rather, the jury should be convinced that the will was read to or by the
testator in such a manner that all of the words included in the will had his
approval.
As to changing the sense of the remainder, Lord Blackburn sug-
gested in the case of Rhodes v. Rhodes" that:
"A much more difficult question arises when the rejection of
words alters the sense of those which remain. For even though
the Court is convinced that the words were improperly intro-
duced . . ., it cannot make the dead man execute a new instru-
ment; and there seems much difficulty in treating the will after
its sense is thus altered as valid within the 9th section of the 7
Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26, the signature at the end of the will re-
quired by that enactment having been attached to what bore
quite a different meaning."5
However, in cases since Rhodes a contra position has been taken by
allowing omissions to be made when the sense of the remainder was
changed. In Morrell v. Morrell,5 the court's omission of a numerical
limitation of a specific bequest caused a greater amount of property
to pass by the bequest. And, in Vaughan v. Clerk,56 the court omitted the
word "real" which had been inserted by mistake before the word
"property," resulting in the passage of both real and personal property
by such provision.
The view expressed in the Morrell and Vaughan cases seems to be
the proper approach. The statement that the sense of the remainder will
be changed by an omission amounts to nothing more than a recognition
that the sense of the words remaining without the words inserted by
mistake is not the same as it was with the words inserted by mistake.
If the meaning of the remainder expresses the testamentary intent of the
testator, the omission should be made; and the meaning of the remainder.
51. In re Triebe's Will, 114 N.J. Eq. 227, 168 Atl. 404 (1933) ; In re Hopkins'
Estate, 277 Pa. 157, 120 Ati. 807 (1923) ; Fulton v. Andrew, L.R. 7 H.L. 448 (1875)
Brisco v. Hamilton, [1902] P. 234.
52. Fulton v. Andrew, L.R. 7 H.L. 448 (1875) ; Gregson v. Taylor, [1917] P. 256.
53. 7 App. Cas. 192, 198 (1882) (dictum).
54. This reasoning was approved in the dictum of a recent case. In re Horracks,
Taylor v. Kershaw, [1939] P. 198 (C.A.).
55. 7 P.D. 68 (1882).
56. 87 L.T.R. (n.s.) 144 (P. 1902).
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when the words inserted by mistake were included, is irrelevant if the
existence of the mistake is clearly proved.
A. Mistaken Insertions-Patent
A patent mistaken insertion is one which appears on the face of the
will (although extrinsic evidence may be necessary to prove, with
certainty, whether or not a mistake was made and what the mistake
was).Y Such mistakes are referred to as patent ambiguities in a con-
struction proceeding. The latter, however, includes both mistakes of
expression and mistaken insertions. In some of the patent mistake cases,
it was clear from the will that a mistake had been made although it was
not clear which of two inconsistent provisions had been inserted by
mistake. Extrinsic evidence was admitted to determine which provision
to omit from probate." Although it is quite probable that extrinsic
evidence would be insufficient, in some cases, to determine with reason-
able certainty which of two inconsistent provisions had been inserted in
the will by mistake, a court should always hear extrinsic evidence to
determine whether or not it is reliable. 9 In one English case 0 it was not
clear that a mistake had been made, as there was merely an uncertainty
in the will caused by two equal bequests of money to the same beneficiary.
The court had to rely upon extrinsic evidence not only to determine
whether or not a mistaken insertion had been made but also to determine
which provision was inserted by mistake. While extrinsic evidence
was admitted by the English court in the latter case, it would seem that
reasonable certainty would be more difficult to attain in such a case.
Mistaken reference is another type of patent mistake. In such cases
extrinsic evidence was admitted to prove that a reference in a codicil
to the date of a prior revoked will was mistakenly inserted.6 It would
seem that extrinsic evidence can always be admitted in mistaken refer-
ence cases.
62
57. This definition includes a situation which is neither completely patent nor
latent. This situation occurs when a mistaken insertion creates an uncertainty in a will
but the existence of the mistake is not determined until extrinsic evidence is admitted.
See notes 61, 68 infra and accompanying text.
58. Goods of Schott, [1901] P. 190; Goods of Walkley, 1 R. 480 (1893) ; Goods of
Duane, 2 Sw. & Tr. 590, 164 Eng. Rep. 1127 (P. 1862).
59. When a jury is being utilized, it may be desirable to hear the evidence without
their presence.
60. Goods of Boehm, [1891] P. 247.
61. Jane v. Jane, The Times, March 30, 1917; Goods of Reade, [1902] P. 75; Goods
of Snowden, 75 L.T.R. (n.s.) 279 (1896) ; Goods of Gordon, [1892] P. 228. The inclu-
sion of these cases as patent rather than latent mistakes is debatable. Their inclusion
is based upon the fact that when the testator's will, which includes his codicil, is ex-
amined, it appears that the codicil portion refers to the date of a prior revoked will.
62. An intent to revive the revoked will was not indicated in any of these cases.
If such intent had appeared, omission could not have been made.
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In several of the English cases in which omission was made, the
mistake could probably have been corrected by construction. In Goods
of Schott" there was a provision in which all of the testator's real and
personal estate, not otherwise specifically disposed of, was devised and"
bequeathed to his trustees. In another provision it was stated that after
payment of the testator's debts, funeral and testamentary expenses, and
specific devises and bequests, the trustees should "stand possessed of
the net revenue of the said proceeds" upon the trusts declared in the will.
The evidence indicated that the will was not read to the testator. The
instructions of the testator and the testimony of the solicitor indicated
that the word "revenue" had been substituted for "residue" as a result
of a clerical error by the testator's solicitor. The court omitted the words
"revenue of the said." Although the provision would not have been quite
as clear with the words "of the said" included,6 4 those words were not
inserted by mistake and should not have been omitted. As the trustees
would not have held the revenue of the proceeds in trust unless the
proceeds were also held in trust, and as the will bequeathed the residuary
estate to the trustees in another provision, the testamentary intent seems
clear. Thus, a construction court could have achieved the same result
by treating the provision as patently ambiguous and by giving no meaning
to the words "nett revenue" or "revenue of the said." Furthermore, in
the mistaken reference cases the erroneous reference in the codicil to the
date of a revoked will could have been given no meaning because the
reference to the date was necessary for a proper identification of the will
intended.
It would seem that whenever there is a mistaken insertion with the
correct disposition remaining in the will and the provisions in the will are
merely uncertain as opposed to being completely inconsistent, the mistake
could be corrected by construction as a patent ambiguity. Since correction
by construction can be made from the will itself, omission is more diffi-
cult because of the necessity of gathering extrinsic evidence to prove
63. [1901] P. 190. Cf. Goods of Duane, 2 Sw. Tr. 590, 164 Eng. Rep. 1127 (P.
1862 )where the drafter of the will failed to cross out standard printed terms on a form
will for soldiers. The written terms of the will were inconsistent with the printed
terms. The court omitted the printed terms. Although this case can possibly be
properly considered as a mistaken insertion case, it is sui generis. American courts
probably could have corrected the inconsistency as a patent ambiguity by merely giving
preference to the written provisions rather than the printed provisions. Construction
would be an easier method of correction for situations similar to Goods of Duane for
the same reason as in Goods of Schott; and, the risk of intestacy because of uncertainty
in the intent seems slight.
64. With the words "of the said" included, the will would have read, "... stand
possessed of the nett - of the said proceeds .... .," while without those words
the will would have read, ". . . stand possessed of the nett - proceeds .. "
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that words were inserted by mistake. Therefore, in such cases there
appears to have been little reason for American lawyers to request
omission. However, this situation would seem to be extremely rare.
The cases of Goods of Boehm65 and Goods of Walkley68 exemplify
situations in which omission would be the only method of correction
because evidence that a word was inserted by mistake, necessary for
correction, is inadmissible in a construction -proceeding.6" In Goods of
Walkley the testator owned houses at 103, 105, and 107 Elthorne-road
which were all devised by the testator to different persons in the original
draft of the will. In the final draft, a clerk inadvertently inserted the
number 103 twice, but made no mention of number 105. The probate
court omitted one number 103, leaving a blank. Although the final
draft had been read to the testator, the court apparently felt that it was
not properly read. In addition to the evidence of a mistake, the fact that
the original draft was also read by the testator no doubt justified the
court's conclusion concerning the insufficiency as to the reading of the
final draft. In the absence of evidence indicating which number 103 was
inserted by mistake, a court would not have been able to determine
whether the testator intended each devisee to receive a house or which de-
visee was intended to receive number 103 and which devisee was to receive
number 105. The same difficulty would normally be present whenever
there is a mistaken insertion creating two completely inconsistent pro-
visions in the will. Therefore, correction by construction would not be
possible.
In Goods of Boeh~m the testator sent instructions for the preparation
of his will to a friend who gave them to the testator's solicitor who gave
them to a conveyancing counsel for the purpose of preparing a draft will.
The friend, solicitor, and conveyancing counsel stated in affidavits that
the instruction directed equal gifts of £10,000 be bequeathed to each of
the testator's two unmarried daughters. By inadvertence, the con-
veyancing counsel inserted the name of one daughter in both bequests ;68
65. [1891] P. 247.
66. 1 R. 480 (1893).
67. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
68. Although it is frequently stated that a testator is bound by the acts of his
attorney, this is true only when the attorney is not mistaken as to the testator's intent.
An intentional mistaken insertion, resuling from a misunderstanding of the testator's
intent, from a clerical error, or from an error as to facts which the attorney assumes,
can be corrected. Of course, it is essential that the testator has not read the will in
such a manner as to know and approve the mistake. Waite v. Frisbie, 45 Minn. 361, 47
N.W. 1069 (1891), aff'd, 48 Minn. 420, 51 N.W. 217 (1892) ; Brisco v. Hamilton, [1902]
P. 234 (attorney assumed testatrix owned only 1/ of the property) ; Morrell v. Morrell,
7 P.D. 68 (1882) (clerical insertion of the word "forty"); Goods of Oswald, L.R. 3
P. & D. 162 (1874) (without knowledge that the lost document disposed of only a
portion of the testator's property, attorney inserted revocation clause of all previous
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as a result, there were two gifts of £10,000 to one daughter. Although
the will was never read to the testator, a summary, which accurately
included a bequest for each daughter, was read to the testator. The
probate court omitted one of the names in the will, leaving a blank.
Although no information has been found as to the ultimate distribution
of the estate, it seems reasonable to surmise that each daughter received
£10,000.69 If omission had not been made,"0 one daughter would have
received a windfall of £10,000 while the other daughter would have
received nothing. Goods of Boehm can be distinguished from Goods of
Walkley on the basis that in the former the mistake created only an
uncertainty rather than two completely inconsistent dispositions as in
Goods of Walkley.7 ' However, because evidence that a word was inserted
by mistake was necessary for correction, omission would be the only
method of correction in both cases.
In the foregoing cases, with the exception of the mistaken reference
cases, the instructions for the will constituted crucial evidence that the
inconsistency in the will was caused by a mistaken insertion. When the
mistake or inconsistency is indicated by the will and the instructions
have not been in the hands of a person who could benefit thereby,
reliance upon the instructions seems justified."2 In the mistaken reference
cases the testimony of the attorney was relied upon to prove the nature
of the mistake. Since the existence of a mistake was apparent without
such evidence and the mistaken reference could be inferred from the
existence of the mistake, the admission of such evidence seems quite
proper.
wills). In the Waite case, the will was denied probate because the attorney had inserted
a clause which failed to effectuate the testator's intent, and the clause had not been read
to the testator. Unless the attorney misunderstood the testator's intent, the will should
have been probated because a testator is bound by the legal effect of language used
by his attorney.
69. Since Goods of Boehin was a consent decree and since each daughter probably
would have received £10,000 in a construction proceeding, the only reasonable conclusion
is that each daughter received £10,000. See J. Warren, Interpretation of W'ills-Recent
Developments, 49 HARV. L. REV. 689, 712-14 (1936) where the writer discusses the facts
which would justify such a result in a construction proceeding.
70. The action was not contested in either Goods of Boehm or Goods off Walkley.
Since latent mistakes can be corrected even though the action is contested, this factor
should not affect the result.
71. In both cases the provision was inconsistent with the testator's testamentary
intent. However, this inconsistency was not apparent in Goods of Boeln until extrinsic
evidence was admitted.
72. The admission of the instructions for the will in order to omit a patent mis-
taken insertion is analogous to their admission to clarify a latent ambiguity. See Brad-
ley v. Rees, 113 Ill. 327, 55 Am. Rep. 422 (1885) ; Covert v. Sebern, 73 Iowa 564, 35
N.W. 636 (1887); Bond v. Riley, 317 Mo. 594, 296 S.W. 401 (1927).
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B. Mistaken Insertions-Latent
A latent mistaken insertion is one" which does not appear on the face
of the will. Such mistakes should be dichotomized according to whether
the mistaken insertion results in a misdescription of a beneficiary or of
property disposed of by the will, or in a non-misdescription. As indicated
supra, some misdescriptions are referred to as latent ambiguities in con-
struction proceedings. In such cases, the existence of the mistake is clear
when the court attempts to make the disposition of the testator's estate.
The English probate courts will admit extrinsic evidence to prove that
part of the description was inserted by mistake." But, in the misdescrip-
tion cases which do not involve latent ambiguities and in the non-
misdescription cases, extrinsic evidence must be relied upon to establish
the existence of a mistake; therefore, it would seem proper to require
safeguards securing the reliability of the evidence which forms the basis
for making an omission. Such safeguards were present in the English
cases where omission was made.74
Mistaken insertions which cause misdescriptions that are latent
ambiguities can be corrected in a construction proceeding because evi-
dence to prove a word had been inserted by mistake would not be necessary
for clarification of the ambiguity. As the testamentary intent is suf-
ficiently certain for correction of such misdescriptions in a construction
proceeding, the admission of extrinsic evidence in a will contest to prove
that part of the description was inserted by mistake seems clearly
justified."5
The following misdescription cases which involve latent ambiguities
indicate some of the possible problems when omission is requested and
also the scope of evidence admissible to solve them. In Gregson v.
Taylor78 the will included a legacy of £5,000 to Adelaide Maud Ashwin,
the wife of F. M. B. Ashwin, which was a correct disposition under the
facts. However, a codicil contained a bequest "To Maud Adelaide Ash-
73. In re Clark, 101 "L.J.P. (n.s.) 27 (1932); Gregson v. Taylor, [1917] P. 256;
Brisco v. Hamilton, [1902] P. 234.
74. Fulton v. Andrew, L.R. 7 H.L. 448 (1875) ; Vaughan v. Clerk, 87 L.T.R. (n.s.)
144 (P. 1902) ; Morrell v. Morrell, 7 P.D. 68" (1882) ; Goods of Oswald, L.R. 3 P. & D.
162 (1874).. See pp. 577-79 infra. Omission was denied in the f6llowing cases: In re
Horrocks, Taylor v. Kershaw, [1939] P. 198 (C.A.); Garnett-Botfield v. Garnett-
Botfield, [1901] P. 3351 Harter v. Harter, L.R. 3 P. & D. 11 (1873) ; Atter v. Atkinson,
L.R. 1 P. & D. 665 (1869) ; Guardhouse v. Blackburn, L.R. 1 P. & D. 108 (1866). The
strict rule with respect to the effect of the reading of the will by the testator was ex-
pressed in'the last three cases and was the determining fact in the Harter and Atter
cases. Since the Fidton case later removed the conclusive nature of that rule, omission
would probably be granted now in the fact situations represented by the Harter and Atter
cases.
75. Since construction will still be necessary even though omission is made, omis-
sion will be of no" benefit except in the states which strictly apply the single plain mean-
ing rule ..
76. [1917] P. 256.
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win (daughter of Francis Manley Bird Ashwin) the sum of 4,000 1 ......
Ashwin's wife was named Adelaide Maud, and Ashwin did not have a
daughter. The plaintiff, a residuary legatee, asked for omission of the
entire clause, while the defendant beneficiary, Adelaide, asked only for
omission of the words in parenthesis, but conceded that she would have
preferred to allow the construction court to rectify the mistake. Evi-
dence indicated that although the testator usually called the defendant
"Dolly" and often reversed the given and middle names of the defendant,
the testator knew that the defendant was the wife rather than the daughter
of Ashwin. It was questionable from the evidence whether the bequest
in the codicil was intended as an addition to or as a revocation of the
legacy in the will. The codicil was read to the testator by the solicitor.
The solicitor testified that he inserted the words "daughter of Francis
Manley Bird Ashwin," mistakenly assuming that Maud Adelaide was
probably the daughter of Adelaide Maud.
Since the misdescription of the name of the defendant was not
inserted by mistake, the court clearly could not omit the entire clause as
requested by the plaintiff. Thus, the only question was whether the
court should omit the words in parenthesis or allow the construction
court to rectify the mistake. The court assumed that the reading was not
conclusive, but denied omission for two reasons: first, there was doubt
as to whether or not the codicil provision was to be an addition to or
revocation of the will provision; and, second, the defendant stated that
she preferred that the issue be left to the construction court. This de-
cision seems erroneous. Whether or not the codicil provision was
intended as an addition or revocation was a construction issue as to the
meaning of the *ords and was, therefore; irrelevant in a will contest.
And, as the existence of a mistake pertaining to the words in parenthesis
seemed sufficiently proved, those words should have been omitted
regardless of the preference of the defendant.
The Gregson case could have been corrected with greater ease by con-
struction because evidence that the words "daughter of Francis Manley
Bird Ashwin" were inserted by mistake would not have been necessary,
and because construction was essential regardless of omission due to the
misdescription of the intended legatee. As Ashwin did not have a
daughter named Maud Adelaide, correction by construction would not
be prevented by the single plain meaning rule in the states where it is
strictly applied." It would seem that correction by construction as a
latent ambiguity is a simpler method than correction by omission in most
misdescription cases because of the necessity of gathering evidence for
77. See note 25 supra.
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purposes of omission. In addition, evidence that a word was mistakenly
inserted would not be available in many cases. However, in states where
the single plain meaning rule is strictly applied, omission might be the
only method of correction.
The case of In re Clark"8 indicates the necessity of distinguishing
between evidence of a mistaken insertion and evidence concerning the
meaning of the testator's words. The testator bequeathed property to the
"grandchildren of my uncle George Dennis Armock." George was the
cousin of the testator, rather than his uncle. Although the court omitted
the word "uncle," the evidence seemed to indicate that the testator usually
called George "uncle" and that the word "uncle" was not inserted by
mistake. Omission of the word "uncle" seems to have been erroneous
because the testator meant for the word "uncle" to be physically included
in his will. The same result could have been reached in a construction
proceeding either by giving the word "uncle" no meaning or by giving
the word "uncle" the special meaning which the testator had given it."0
In the latent mistaken insertion cases which result either in non-
misdescriptions, or in misdescriptions that are not latent ambiguities,
correction can be made only by omission. Since extrinsic evidence pur-
porting to prove that a word was inserted by mistake would be the only
evidence to indicate the existence of a mistake, there are no presumptions
which would allow construction. For example, a presumption that the
testator intended to devise only his own property would be of no benefit
for all property described in the will would belong to the testator."0 The
necessity for reliance solely on extrinsic evidence makes certainty as to
the testamentary intent more difficult to attain. As a result, the English
probate courts have made omissions only when the evidence of a mis-
take was both substantial and reliable. Since the problems are the same
in both situations, a single case will serve to indicate the evidence which
has been admitted and found sufficient by the English courts to prove
that a latent mistaken insertion was made.
The case of Morrell v. Morrell1 involved a non-misdescription82
78. 101 L.J.P. (n.s.) 27 (1932).
79. Evans v. Ex'r of Hooper, 3 NJ. Eq. 204 (1835); Moseley v. Goodman, 138
Tenn. 1, 195 S.W. 590 (1917).
80. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
81. 7 P.D. 68 (1882). See also Vaughan v. Clerk, 87 L.T.R. (n.s.) 144 (1902)
(insertion of the word "real" before the word "property"); Goods of Oswald, L.R. 3
P. & D. 162 (1874) (insertion of a revocation clause) ; Guardhouse v. Blackburn, L.R.
1 P. & D. 108 (1866) (insertion of the words "therein and"). Although omission was
denied in the Guardhouse case, the denial was based upon the strict rule as to the effect
of the testator's reading of the will, which rule was changed in Fulton v. Andrew, L.R.
7 H.L. 448 (1875).
82. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
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resulting from a mistaken insertion."3 The instructions given by the
testator to the solicitor indicated that the testator intended to give all his
securities in a corporation, amounting to 400 shares, equally to the
plaintiffs. The solicitor sent the instructions to a conveyancer who mis-
takenly inserted in the will the word "forty" before the word "shares." 4
As a result, the other 360, shares passed to the defendants, the residuary
legatees. The solicitor, not knowing the total number of shares, recopied
the mistaken provision in the will. The widow of the testator and a friend,
neither of whom were parties to the action, testified that the testator
always spoke of all the shares as being intended for the plaintiffs."s
The- solicitor also testified to the error. The testimony of the widow,
friend, and solicitor, the collusion which otherwise would have to be
implied between the solicitor, conveyancer, widow, friend and plaintiffs,
and the non-reading of the will were sufficient circumstances for the
court to accept the instructions as evidence of the existence of a mistake
and thus to omit the word "forty."
The English court relied very heavily on instructions by the testator
in the Morrell case. However, the admission of those instructions must
be distinguished from the admission of instructions in the misdescription
cases which involved latent ambiguities because in the latter the existence
of the mistake was either apparent or indicated when disposition was
attempted. 8 The reliability of the instructions which proved the mistake
83. Fulton v. Andrew, L.R. 7 H.L. 448 (1875) illustrates a misdescription case
which does not involve a latent ambiguity. The contestants of the will alleged that the
residuary clause had been inserted by mistake. By the residuary clause, the propounders
were made both the residuary legatees and the executors of the will. The propounders
were friends of the testator but were each given specific bequests in another part of
the will. As the will had been prepared by one of the propounders, the burden of proof
was on the propounders as to any objection to the due execution of the will. Since the
propounders were attempting to prove that no mistake existed and since the propounders
had custody of the testator's instructions, there could be little doubt as to the validity
of such instructions if the instructions cast doubt on the case presented by the pro-
pounders. There were two sets of instructions given to one of the propounders by the
testator. Both sets created doubt as to whether the testator intended the propounders
to take as residuary legatees or as trustees for others. Since the jury found that the
residuary clause was inserted by mistake, apparently relying upon the instructions to the
will, the court omitted that clause. This case represents an unusual situation because
the burden of proof was not on the party trying to prove the existence of a mistake but
upon the party trying to prove the non-existence of a mistake. This circumstance was
particularly significant because it provided the safeguard which secured the reliability of
the evidence introduced to prove the existence of a mistake. A similar situation was
presented in Atter v. Atkinson, L.R. 1 P. & D. 665 (1869).
84. See note 68 supra.
85. Extrinsic evidence of declarations of testamentary intent should never be the
sole basis for establishing the existence of a mistaken insertion in either a non-
misdescription case or a misdescription case which does not involve a latent ambiguity
because of its unreliability. However, such evidence seems sufficiently reliable to lend
weight to other evidence of a mistake.
86. Cf. note 72 supra and accompanying' text.
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in the Morrell case was secured by the fact that the instructions were
examined by other persons. The absence of such circumstances would
probably render instructions unreliable in both the misdescription cases
that do not involve latent ambiguities and in the non-misdescription cases.
CONCLUSION
American courts have corrected mistaken insertions in wills by
construction but not by omission. English courts, however, have used
both methods. As some mistaken insertions cannot be corrected by con-
struction, but can be corrected by omission, the failure of the American
courts to make omissions evoked an examination of the probate theory
applicable in the United States. As a result of this examination, the con-
clusion has been reached that omission is sound in theory and consistent
with both the language and the underlying theory of probate statutes.
An inquiry into the extent to which construction could be used as a
method to correct mistaken insertions in a will indicated that, with a few
rare exceptions, construction is an alternative remedy only when the
mistake results in a misdescription which is a latent ambiguity. In the
other misdescription cases and in the non-misdescription cases, omission
is the only method of correction because extrinsic evidence would be
necessary to prove that a word had been inserted by mistake. Such
extrinsic evidence is inadmissible in construction proceedings. In such
cases the necessary evidence which could be admitted is fairly difficult
to acquire because reliance must be placed entirely on extrinsic evidence
to prove the existence of a mistake. In addition, omission is the only
method of correction in those misdescription cases in which some states
would deny the existence of a latent ambiguity because of a strict applica-
tion of the single plain meaning rule as well as in the patent mistaken
insertion cases which involve two inconsistent provisions. But, in the
latter cases the necessary evidence would seem to be muctn easier to
acquire.8 7
The explanation for the absence of American cases allowing omis-
sion when construction is not an available remedy can only be speculative.
Omission has perhaps been made in some cases which have not been
reported because the parties did not appeal the decision. Although it is
possible that cases in which the only method of correction is omission
are not occurring in the United States, this possibility fails to explain
the many cases in which the single plain meaning rule has been applied,
87. As mentioned earlier, such cases can be adequately corrected by construction
except when the single plain meaning rule is applied denying the existence of any am-
biguity. In the latter cases as well as the infrequent other cases in which the necessary
evidence is available, omission should be requested.
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unless the unlikely assumption is made that all such cases resulted from
mistakes in expression rather than mistaken insertions. In these latter
cases lawyers seem to have been unaware of the availability of omission
as a method of correction.
The failure to request the omission of words inserted in a will by
mistake frequently appears to have caused the testator's testamentary
intent to be defeated. As the probate objective is to achieve the testa-
mentary intent whenever possible, the legal profession in the United
States should, whenever possible, utilize omission to achieve the probate
objective.
THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
REQUIREMENT OF "RESIDENCE" FOR NATURALIZATION
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 requires aliens seek-
ing naturalization to have "resided continuously" within the United
States for five years before they are naturalized.1 The duty to apply this
concept of "continuous residence" to the facts as they arise falls to the
judiciary, since citizenship, with its accompanying benefits, is a privilege
made available by statute and bestowed by court action with the advice
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The recommendation
of the Service may or may not be followed. When an alien contests an
adverse recommendation of the Immigration Service, a trial follows,
with the Service and the applicant as adversary parties. The ultimate
determination of when citizenship should be bestowed rests with the
judiciary.
The legislative inclusion of a requirement of five years of "con-
tinuous residence" has been viewed as a delegation to the courts of the
function of determining in each case whether a petitioner's acts and state
of mind during this period are of the sort which satisfy the broad statu-
tory policy of protecting the interests of United States citizens in the
"Americanization" of future naturalized citizens.
In 1952, Congress codified all prior acts concerning immigration and
naturalization, and added some new provisions, in enacting the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act. The Act retained the old provisions stating that
continuous absence from the country for over a year, unless within a
specific exception, "shall break the continuity of such residence" as a
1. 66 Stat. 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1952).
